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Michael Perry's Right to Religious
Freedom
Richard S. Kay*
Michael Perry's defense and elaboration of a human right of
religious freedom' is, like all of his work, the reflection of careful
and creative thought. He has, in this essay, meticulously set forth
criteria for recognizing such a human right and then has
measured religious liberty against those criteria. His case for the
human right is compelling and any weaknesses in it appear to
inhere in the very nature of the concepts at issue. Typically, Perry
has not presented the argument in the easy case. Rather, he
elaborates it in the context of a society (his theocratic Elysium, a
perfectly imaginable society) where his claims are tested in the
most difficult circumstances. In so doing he has revealed both the
appeal and the limits of a practical public space for religious
* George and Helen England Professor of Law, University of
Connecticut, School of Law. This is a revised version of comments delivered
at the conference on Religious Liberty in America and Beyond: Celebrating
the Legacy of Roger Williams on the 400' Anniversary of his Birth, held at
the Ralph R. Papitto School of Law, Roger Williams University, Bristol,
Rhode Island, October 15, 2004. I am grateful to Carol Weisbrod for valuable
suggestions.
1. Michael Perry, A Human Right to Religious Freedom? The
Universality of Human Rights, the Relativity of Culture, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 385 (2005). In these comments I follow Perry's terminology
speaking of a right of "religious freedom" or "religious liberty." E.g., id. at
393. In fact, his discussion speaks only to a right of toleration of dissident
religious beliefs or practices. See id. at 400-08. The term, "religious freedom,"
may arguably be applied to a wider idea, embracing equality of religious
practices. See Carol Weisbrod, Address at the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of Legal History Regarding Toleration, Pluralism and
Research on Religion in America (Oct. 29, 2004) (on file with author). For an
illuminating and rigorous analysis of the basis of a policy of exemption from
public duties for religious dissidents, see generally Steven D. Smith, The
Tenuous Case for Conscience, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 325 (2005).
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freedom.
My purpose in these comments is to add some complications
and doubts to Perry's lucid and precise presentation. I will raise
two particular aspects of the right he describes. The first concerns
the prospects for making the case for religious freedom to sincere
adherents of human rights who are also sincere believers in a
religion that prescribes a single path to salvation. The second
concerns the consequences of defining the right in a necessarily
qualified way. Emphasizing these two problems raises some grim
possibilities: First, the likelihood of establishing a broad right to
religious liberty may be least where it is needed the most; second,
even where codified in legally enforceable form, religious freedom
may not protect religious practice much more than would be the
case in the absence of such a legal right.
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN A BELIEVING SOCIETY

Perry hypothesizes a society, Elysium, in which the great
majority of the population adheres to a religion ("the one true
faith," or TOTF) that simultaneously holds two relevant precepts.
First, it believes in "human rights" as Perry defines them. That is,
the governing elements of the society accept the proposition that
"every human being has inherent dignity, and is therefore
inviolable." 2 In addition, however, they also hold to a theological
teaching that there is no salvation outside TOTF.3 Let us take as a
given that conversion of, and therefore salvation for, non-TOTFers
is made more difficult by the open existence of competing creeds. 4
How then should the law implement the Elysian commitment to
respecting and cherishing every human being? Perry reasonably
supposes that, at least in the first instance, the authorities of
Elysium can best show their concern for their dissenting fellow
citizens by maximizing the chances that they will achieve
salvation. 5 That will involve reducing the opportunities for them,
as well as for existing TOTFers, to be led astray. Therefore,
Elysian authorities will prohibit proselytism and public worship
for non-TOTF religions. An argument that this limitation violates
2. Perry, supra note 1, at 401.
3. Id. at 402.
4. This is not, of course, an unarguable proposition. But history tells us
that most religious societies have assumed its truth.
5. Perry, supra note 1, at 406.
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human rights would be akin to an argument that there is a
human right to disease against health, or to stupidity against
wisdom. For believers it will be self-evident that, as Perry notes,
"error has no rights."6
Perry finds such a regime incompatible with a society that
genuinely respects human rights. That is because his concept of
human rights demands protecting people "against actions/policies
that, even if they do not violate human beings, are nonetheless a
source of unwarranted human suffering."7 But the Elysians, of
course, find the suffering inherent in their restrictions anything
but unwarranted. Perry's difference with them thus depends not
on an argument about human rights in general, but about
whether TOTF is "true." Perry agrees that his position depends on
an assumption that the TOTFers' beliefs in an exclusive route to
salvation are based on a "mistaken theology."8
People who do not think that there is only one path to
salvation may be persuaded by Perry's arguments to bring
external pressure to bear on the erring society. But within that
society itself we may expect his position to have a limited appeal.
That is because we have now transformed the argument about the
value of a right of religious freedom into one over theology.
History has shown us that rational argument has had limited
success in resolving religious differences. Intuitively, the
resistance to such attempts would seem to be stiffest exactly
among those groups who are convinced they already know the one
and only truth. Perry's response to this difficulty is a brave one. If
we reject the mistaken theology of TOTF and embrace the value of
religious liberty, we should never concede the futility of dialogue.
Perry quotes Ronald Beiner that "the next stage of argument may
yet bring an enlargement of moral vision to one of the contending
parties.... [T]here is no need to give in to moral or intellectual
'pluralism', for it always remains open to us to say 'Press on with
the argument."' 9
6. Id. at 408 n.39 (quoting John T. Noonan, Jr., Development in Moral
Doctrine, 54 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 662, 669 (1993)).
7. Id. at 406.
8. Id. at 407, 422.
9. Id. at 425. It might be noted that both of the writers to whom Perry
cites in support of his view that it is worthwhile to continue to argue
questions like this do so in the context of morality in general, and not with
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Gains from argument, however, generally depend on appeals
to reason on both sides. Not every religion agrees with the
sentiments of Martin Luther that reason is the "greatest whore
the devil has," and that faith empowered him to "trample reason
with its wisdom underfoot." 10 But certainly some version of that
conviction does characterize many of the world's religions, not
excluding-as Luther exemplifies - certain forms of Christianity.
Aquinas found reason to be useful only in determining the
consequences that follow from sacred principles, but that those
principles themselves were grounded in revelation: "If our
opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer
any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning, but only of
answering his objections - if he has any - against faith."" When a

religion is based on revealed truth, there may well be argument
about the meaning of the revelation. But that is hardly the kind of
discourse which Perry proposes. If the foundations of faith
transcend reason, there is little basis for hoping that basic
differences in theology can be resolved by just talking about them.
Perry suggests an alternative basis for protecting religious
practice that does not depend on theological argument. Even those
committed to TOTF might give way if the right of religious liberty
is necessary to maintain social peace. The state's respect for the
human rights of the dissenters, considered alone, would require it
to maximize the chances of their conversion. But a broader
examination might reveal that toleration would maximize the
welfare of the whole population (including that of believers) by
eliminating the potential for social discord and violence. There is
respect to a specifically religion-based morality. See

RONALD BEINER,

Phillipa Foot, Moral
Relativism, in RELATIVISM: COGNITIVE AND MORAL 152, 162-66 (Jack W.
Meiland & Michael Krausz eds., 1982). Indeed Beiner insists that "[flor
judgment at all to be possible, there must be standards of judgment, and this
implies a community of judgment ..... BEINER, supra, at 142.
10. A slightly different English version of these quotations is reproduced
in many places without citation. The language in the text, does not, however,
seem to appear in any published English translations of Luther's works. The
original German is found at 16 DR. MARTIN LUTHER'S SAMMTLICHE WERKE
142, 145 (Erlangen ed. 1826-57). Pascal put the point more gently when he
said that "[tihe heart has reasons that reason cannot know." BLAISE PASCAL,
PENSEES, No. 277 (W.F. Trotter trans., N.Y. Dutton 1958) (1660).
11. ST. THOMAS ACQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q.1, art. 8, in 19 GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 8 (Robert Maynard Hutchins et al. eds., 1952).
POLITICAL JUDGMENT

141-44,

187 n.17

(1983);
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much wisdom in this argument, and it appears to fit well with the
actual experiences of tolerant societies. 12 Whether that reasoning
would convince committed believers in TOTF, however, is another
matter.
The argument supposes the authorities will perform some
kind of cost-benefit analysis. They may be convinced that
expanding the scope of religious freedom would best maintain
peace and order. But would they find that benefit sufficient to
overcome the costs - costs measured in souls lost to damnation.
Avoiding that terrible result might appear to more than justify the
additional burden of maintaining social order.
Moreover, it is worth remembering that, as a historical
matter, the idea that religious liberty conduces to the
maintenance of order has been the minority view. 13 The usual
assumption is that religious uniformity is most likely to produce
social peace. 14 The principle of "cuius regio, eius religio," while
authorizing religious diversity among states, depended on an
assumption that religious differences within states promoted
disorder." The European Court of Human Rights held recently
that the Turkish ban on the use of headscarves by university
students did not violate the right of religious freedom in the
European Convention on Human Rights; it did so based in part on
the government's claim that the prohibition was necessary to
protect public order.16
Thus neither of the possible arguments that Perry suggests
looks particularly promising as a way of persuading the devoted
12.

See

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC

65-72 (1960).
13. John Locke and Roger Williams were two of the earliest proponents
of the idea that religious liberty was essential to social harmony and order.
See, eg., Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams on Liberty of Conscience, 10
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 289, 300 (2005); Kathleen A. Brady, Foundations
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION

for Freedom of Conscience: Stronger than You Think, 10

ROGER WILLIAMS U.

L. REV. 359,381-82 (2005).
14. See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in
ConstitutionalDiscourse, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 149, 163-65 (1991).

15. For a more thorough discussion on this topic, see Eberle, supra note
13, at 308-09.
16. See Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 (June 29, 2004); see
also Otto-Preminger Inst. v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep.
34, 63 (1994) (noting state interest in limiting individual rights "to preserve
religious peace.").
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leaders of Elysium to embrace religious liberty. Both positions
may be appealing to those who do not think TOTF is the only way
to salvation, but these people already need little convincing that
the policy of Elysium is offensive.
THE CONTENT OF THE RIGHT OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

The second aspect of Perry's right of religious freedom I wish
to discuss relates to the qualified character of the right as it is
defined in his article. As elaborated, religious practice may,
consistent with that right, still be limited or prohibited for a
sufficient reason. The question arises whether or not this
qualification deprives the concept of the central features we
associate with "rights" - namely an immunity of protected activity
from the general regulatory power of the state.
Perry notes that it would be impractical to understand
freedom of religion as protecting any religiously motivated act:
"[T]he right to freedom of religious exercise does not - because it
cannot - privilege one to do, on the basis of religious belief or for
religious reasons, whatever one wants wherever one wants
whenever one wants." 17 He observes that this concern is captured
in the text of Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Covenant). That article protects the "right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion [including freedom] to
manifest [that] religion in worship, observance, practice and
teaching."1 8 Importantly, the article then goes on in paragraph (3)
to declare:
Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief may be
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law
and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health,
or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others. 9
The retention of a potential for regulation is, as Perry
observes, more than a practical response to the risk of dangerously

17. Perry, supra note 1, at 397 n.26.
18. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 18(1), Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
19. Id. art. 18(3).
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anti-social conduct. 20 It is also essential if the right to religious
freedom is to be understood as a genuine human right-one that
can resist the critique of rights based on cultural relativism. The
permissible justifications for limiting the exercise of that right
mentioned in the text of the Covenant may work out differently in
different societies. On this reasoning an infringement of the right
of religious practice might be found necessary to protect public
order and, therefore, consistent with the Covenant in India,
whereas it would not be necessary and thus a violation of the
same right in Canada.
Does this qualified version of the right leave it, in common
understanding, as a "right" at all? It is true that structured in this
way the right of religious freedom only permits the state to limit
the right to "manifest one's religion."21 Belief itself, "thought
conscience and religion," appears by implication to be absolutely
protected. 22 That distinction, however, will be little comfort to
many believers. This is apparent when we see that the Covenant
illustrates "manifestations" by the examples of "worship,
observance, practice and teaching."23 These aspects of religion are,
for many creeds, far from incidental. Indeed one might ask what
would be left of a religion from which these elements were
subtracted?
The distinction between belief and practice has been regularly
treated but never satisfactorily explained in American "free
exercise" jurisprudence. 24 In 1990 when the United States
Supreme Court resurrected that distinction in Employment
Division v. Smith25 by upholding the application of controlled
substance laws to the ritual use of peyote by Native Americans,
the reaction among advocates of religious liberty was one of
20. Perry, supra note 1, at 420-23.
21. ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 18(3).
22. Id. art. 18(1).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879); see also
Carol Weisbrod & Pamela Sheingorn, Reynolds v. United States: Nineteenth
Century Forms of Marriage and the Status of Women, 10 CoNN. L. REv. 828
(1978) (discussing social background of Reynolds); Carol Weisbrod, Family,
Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalityand Religious Authority, 26
J. FAM. L. 741, 746-59 (1987-88) (commenting on the character of claims for
exemption on a religious basis).
25. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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alarm. 6
In addition, this qualified definition of the right raises a
problem of differential protection of different religions. An
absolute immunity of interference with belief along with potential
regulation of practice would probably be more valuable to, say, a
Congregationalist than to a Muslim. That is because the internal
aspect of being a Congregationalist represents a relatively more
significant aspect of the religion than does the purely internal
aspect of Islam. Islam (more than Congregationalism) is a matter
of doing as well as thinking and feeling.27 The "five pillars" of
Islam all involve what the Covenant would regard as
"manifestations" of religion. 28 While the differences are certainly
not linear, we can imagine that various religions would benefit
more or less according to the relative importance of inner belief
and outward behavior. 29
To this it is proper to respond that the human right of
religious freedom, as outlined by Perry, does not, in fact, leave
manifestations of religion unprotected. To the contrary, Article 18
explicitly states that such manifestations may not be interfered
with except for certain purposes and then only in limited
circumstances. That is, the right defined in the text singles out
religious practice for special protection not by prohibiting any and
every interference with it, but by demanding that such
26. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1990); Frederick Mark Gedicks,
Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671, 688 (1992). Most
notably, Congress reacted with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1993), attempting to require special justification
for public burdens on religious practice caused by generally applicable laws.
This requirement was held unconstitutional in Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997), as an invalid attempt by Congress to use its power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment to redefine constitutional rights. Id. at 511.
27. The relative austerity of Congregationalism can be easily
summarized by the words of one of its primary founders, John Cotton: "I love
to sweeten my mouth with a piece of Calvin before I sleep." DIARMAID
MACCULLOCH, THE REFORMATION: A HISTORY 520 (2003).
28. SACHIKO MARATA & WILLIAM C. CHrITICK, VISION OF ISLAM,

(1994).

8-29

29. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the
Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933, 946 (1989); Robert Charles
Ward, The Spirits Will Leave: Preventing the Desecration of Native American
Sacred Sites, 19 ECOL. L. Q 795, 811 (1992) ("The 'belief-practice'
distinction.., reflects a bias in favor of religions that are portable.").
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interference be subject to a particularly rigorous form of scrutiny.
As provided in the text of the Covenant, any restriction must be
shown to satisfy three criteria: (1) It must be "prescribed by law";
(2) It must have the purpose of protecting one of a list of particular
interests; and (3) it must be "necessary" for the protection of such
an interest. 30 There is no court that adjudicates violations of the
Covenant, but experience with interpretation of the parallel
provisions in the European Convention of Human Rights raises
questions about how strong a safeguard such a qualified right can
be.
The "prescribed by law" requirement may be the most
valuable. As interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights,
any limitation of the relevant rights must take the form of an
accessible and reasonably clear rule of law. This does not mean,
however, that the restriction must be codified in advance of the
regulated action. The European Court, for example, has held that
common law rules can be "prescribed by law" if they are
31
sufficiently settled before the claimed right violation. It has also
held that even unpublished regulations that were "highly
32
technical and complex" were still "prescribed by law." Thus

religious dissenters may take only moderate comfort from this
scheme. Their observances may not be suppressed willy-nilly, but
in a state largely controlled by a dominant orthodoxy this formal
obstacle to regulation is, at best, modest.
The requirement that only certain public aims may justify an
interference with religious rights is, in contrast, more or less
illusory. That is because the specified permissible bases for
regulation of rights-protected behavior cover practically the whole
field of conceivable public action: the "public safety, order, health,
33
or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms others." It is
hard to think of any realistic regulation that could not be
rationally included under one of these categories, and I know of no
case in which the European Court of Human Rights has failed to
accept a proffered state objective.
30. Supra notes 17 & 18 and accompanying text.
31. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Series A, No. 38, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep.
46-49 (1981).
245,
32. Groppera Radio AG et al. v. Switzerland, App. No. 10890/84, 12 Eur.
65-68 (1990).
H.R. Rep. 321
33. ICCPR, supranote 18, art. 18(8), Gen. Comment 22.
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Beyond the need to state a justification, however, a state
found to have limited a right must show that the restriction is
actually "necessary" to protect the interest cited. Students of
American constitutional law know that there are many kinds of
necessity. There is the stringent "no less burdensome alternative"
version in the "upper tier scrutiny" of certain measures under the
Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 34 But there is also the easy "any means calculated to
produce the end" version applied to the "necessary and proper"
clause defining the limits of Congressional power. 35
This kind of requirement for adequate justification of
presumptive rights violations is common in modern constitutions.
Judicial applications, however, give little indication of just how
strict the required necessity must be. The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedom allows the limitation of many of its rights
only when the challenged measure is "demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society."36 The Supreme Court of Canada has
set forth a multi-factor test for deciding when an interference is so
justified, and that test has been expanded and revised in a
number of cases. The result is an inquiry that takes into
consideration just about every positive and negative aspect of the
challenged action, with respect to the interests of the state as well
as the individuals affected. 37
A similar development has occurred with the identical term in
several articles of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Court in Strasbourg has declared that a sufficient necessity
must "correspond[] to a pressing social need [and be]...
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued."38 In making that
determination, the "Court will take into account that a margin of

34. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
35. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413-14 (1819).
36. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms), § 1.
37. The leading case is R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103. On the
transformations of the Oakes test, see MARK W. JANIS, RIcHARD S. KAY &
ANTHONY W. BRADLEY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXTS AND MATERIALS,

153-56 (2d. ed. 2000).
38. Olsson v. Sweden, App. No. 10465/83, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 259,
(1988).
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appreciation is left to the Contracting States." 39 The Court's
calculation of whether this level of justification has been reached
depends on the particular right implicated, the extent to which the
right has been infringed, the status of the applicant who is
claiming the violation and which of the permissible state
40
objectives has been put forward. The record of adjudication,
moreover, gives no firm assurance that the same combination of
41
factors will always lead to the same result. In practice, this

means that the decision on infringements on religious freedom (as
well as other specified rights) is remitted to a process that
effectively asks whether there is a good enough reason, all things
considered, to uphold any particular measure.
Putting together these two aspects of the definition of the
qualified right we are left with this: the belief-action distinction
leaves any aspect of religion that might genuinely be at risk
subject to potential state control. Such vulnerable religious
practice may be subjected to any kind of interference if the state's
action is thought to be sufficiently useful for some sufficiently
important social purpose. But the political authorities presumably
already undertake such an evaluation before enacting social
regulation. If that is all the right requires, religious activity ends
up in the same position as any other field of human conduct, such
as driving a car or owning property.
I have, however, left out one special consequence that follows
from reaching this state of affairs through the peculiar device of a
qualified right. If religion were not a right, the propriety of
limiting regulations would be determined only in the ordinary
legislative process. In modem constitutional systems, and in some
international human rights regimes, activities that are within the
scope of protected rights are subject to such regulation only to the
extent that some independent court decides it is consistent with
the right as defined in the relevant text. We have seen, however,
that the adjudication will end up evaluating the regulation on
pretty much the same grounds that we can expect the42legislature
to have considered in passing the law in the first place.
39. Id.
See JANIS, KAY & BRADLEY, supra note 37, at 153-56.
See id.
Richard S. Kay, Rights, Rules and Democracy, in PROTECTING HUMAN
RIGHTS: INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS 117 (T. Campbell et.al. eds., 2003).
40.
41.
42.
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So the entrenchment of a right of religious freedom does
indeed give an additional protection to the activity that it
describes, but that protection is not of the kind that we usually
think of in connection with rights. It does not allow a religiously
observant person to know in advance that certain activities are
certainly-or almost certainly-immune from state interference.
Nor can a person know that such activity will be proscribable only
for certain well-defined purposes. A right like this does not carve
out a defined area of sanctuary from intrusion: it requires only
that certain political decisions be approved by a second
independent human judgment. The ingredients of this second
judgment will differ little from those involved in the initial
(legislative) determination. But the decisionmakers will be
different, most prominently insofar as they will not equally be
held to account for their judgment in the ordinary political process
of representative government.
The extent to which rights-holders (in this case observers of
religions whose practice might be limited by regulation) will
benefit from the recognition of this kind of right, therefore, is less
than obvious. On the one hand, rights-holders will not likely be
worse off so long as the second source of judgment (i.e., the courts)
only review decisions made elsewhere and do not initiate action on
their own. 43 The benefits that accrue to the rights-holders will

follow from the workings of a more complicated political structure.
The results may, in their own way, be just as or more
unpredictable than unfettered legislative decision-making. Under
this system, the security of religious liberty will ultimately depend
not on impersonal law but, necessarily, on inconstant human
judgment.

43. This is not as obvious as it might appear. The recognition of
affirmative social or economic constitutional rights may put considerable
creative power in the hands of judges insofar as there are any litigants to put
a subject before them. See, e.g., Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2001
(1) SALR 46 (CC).

